Economic Policy and Business Activity



Academic Year 2017-2018 2nd Semester

Chapter 1 Introduction to economic policy

Theory Lecture 2

1. Introduction to economic policy

1.1. A primer on economic policy

1.2. The whys and hows of public intervention

1.3. Economic Policy Evaluation: Decision Criteria

1.4. Conclusion

- 1.1. A primer on economic policy
- **1.1.1 Three alternative approaches to economic policy**
- 1.1.2 What do policymakers do?
- 1.1.3 The objectives, instruments and institutions of EP
- **1.1.4 Trade-offs, structural reforms and better institutions**

1.2 The whys and hows of public intervention 1.2.1 Three functions of economic policy

1.2.2 Why intervene?

Learning outcomes for lecture 1

- Define and compare the three approaches to economic policy
- Explain the main activities of policy makers
- Describe the main objectives and instruments of economic policy
- Define institutions and their role in economic policy

Learning outcomes for lecture 2 (today)

- Explain the Tinbergen rule relating policy objectives to instruments, and how it relates to trade-offs in economic policy making
- Define institutions and explain how they are related to economic policy
- Distinguish between economic management and structural reforms
- Define and explain the three functions of economic policy

- Suppose a government has n target variables Y₁, Y₂, ... Y_n represented by a vector Y= (Y₁, Y₂, ... Y_n) with n corresponding objectives.
- Its preferences can be summarised by a loss function L that measures the welfare loss associated with a divergence between the values taken by the target variables Y_i and their objective values Y_i:

$$L(Y_1 - \tilde{Y}_1, Y_2 - \tilde{Y}_2, \dots, Y_n - \tilde{Y}_n)$$

- There are p independent policy instruments that can be grouped in a pdimensional vector X = (X₁, X₂, ... X_p)
- With *I* representing the **institutions**
- The functioning of the economy can be represented by: $Y = H_{I}(X)$
- Economic policy then consists in selecting X such that L is minimised, conditional on institutions H₁ (X)

- Economic policy consists in setting the p policy instruments such that the loss function L is minimized
 - If *p* = *n*, the n policy objectives can all be achieved because there is an equal number of instruments
 - If p < n and the n objectives cannot be achieved simultaneously, requiring trading off one objective against another
- **Tinbergen rule** to reach *n* independent policy objectives, the government needs at least an equal number of policy instruments p

- The problem is that governments generally have many objectives but only a limited number of instruments -> so trade-offs are part of governments' everyday life
- If governments know the trade-offs, their choices are conditional on their preferences. Ex: how much more wage inequality they tolerate for a reduction of 1 percentage point in unemployment rate

- If n = p, it is usually possible to find the vector X which allows Y to be exactly at its required target level
- If n > p, the government faces trade-offs: it will chose values for (X₁, X₂, ... X_p) such that, at the margin, it is not possible to improve on any of the targets without reducing welfare due to divergence on other targets. This is illustrated by the equations below for any pair (i, j) of target variables:

$$dL = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{\partial L}{\partial Y_i} \, dY_i = 0 \qquad \qquad \frac{dY_i}{dY_j} = -\frac{\partial L}{\partial Y_j} \frac{\partial L}{\partial Y_i}$$

marginal rate of substitution between Yi and Yj

21.


- Trade-offs illustrate the limits of economic management
- To modify economic policy trade-offs governments need to implement structural reforms that improve their institutions
- According to the IMF, structural reforms are "measures that, broadly speaking, change the institutional framework and constraints governing market behaviour and outcomes"

Consider we wave two objectives Y₁ and Y₂ but only one instrument X, and I represents institutions

$$Y_1 = h_I^1(X), \qquad Y_2 = h_I^2(X)$$

 Policy instrument X can be replaced in both equations so that we obtain a function illustrating the existence of trade-offs between Y₁ and Y₂, conditional on institutions *I*:

$$g_I(Y_1, Y_2) = 0$$



- With institutions *I* and only one policy instrument we cannot increase Y₁ without reducing Y₂ economic management (movements along the curve)
- To obtain a new nature of trade-offs we need to carry out structural reforms by changing institutions, in this case from I to J (shifts the curve)




Figure 1.3 From managing trade-offs to reforming institutions: An illustration.

- Consider the trade-off between productivity and employment, i.e. more employment tends to reduce output per worker and hence the productivity level
- To increase both productivity and employment simultaneously we need to change the institutional framework that governs/regulates market behaviour and outcomes – i.e. we need structural reforms

• Van Reenen: What determines productivity?

For example: changing the rules and incentives to increase investment in technology, research & innovation, management procedures, etc. This will increase firm and employee productivity levels without increasing unemployment.

- It is common but wrong to associate structural reforms with supply-side policies.
 - Making the central bank independent, choosing a new currency regime, or adopting a framework for budgetary policy are structural reforms because they aim at improving existing trade-offs between various objectives.
 - Contrarily, a change in tax rates, which is mostly a supply-side measure, does not have the character of a structural reform.

- Structural reforms are often viewed as having negative short-term effects, but positive long-term effects (e.g. transition of former planned economies of Central and Eastern Europe and the former USSR to market economies)
- These inter-temporal effects of structural reforms raise political economy issues. For a democratic government facing a re-election, undertaking reforms with negative effects in the short term will not make voters happy...

1.2 The whys and hows of public intervention

1.2.1 Three functions of economic policy

1.2.2 Why intervene?

- 1. Allocation of resources (i.e. assignment to alternative uses)
- **2. Macroeconomic stabilisation** in response to exogenous shocks that move the economy away from internal balance
- 3. Income (re)distribution between agents or regions

- Allocation of resources covers policies relating to the assignment of resources to alternative uses:
 - public interventions targeting the quantity or/and quality of factors of production (capital, unskilled and skilled labour, technology, land, etc.), and their sectoral or regional distribution
 - provision of public goods such as infrastructure building or environmental preservation are included in this category

- Macroeconomic stabilisation covers policies aiming at bringing the economy closer to balance or equilibrium
- Policies implemented in response to exogenous shocks that move the economy away from internal balance (i.e. full employment and price stability)
- This function is associated with the role that Keynesian economists usually assign to monetary and budgetary policies

- Income (re)distribution covers policies aiming at correcting the primary distribution of income
- Progressive taxation policies and social transfers are key instruments to this end
- Redistribution has a different scope of allocation and stabilisation because it addresses the distribution of income within society

- The differences between allocation and stabilization functions refer to the distinction between long-term output growth and short-term fluctuations around the trend:
 - allocation policies aim at increasing the maximum level of output that can be reached without creating inflation (potential output)
 - stabilisation policies aim at minimising the divergence between actual and potential outputs (i.e. output gap)

 Consider the production function F, where Y is the output, K is the capital stock, and N is employment. K and N depend on time, so does F as improvements in technology allow more to be produced with the same amount of factors.

$$Y_t = F_t(K_t, N_t)$$


• In the short-run K is exogenous $(K_t = \overline{K}_t)$. \overline{N}_t is the employment level when the unemployment rate is at the equilibrium level. **Potential output** can be defined as:

$$\overline{Y}_t = F_t(\overline{K}_t, \overline{N}_t)$$

• **Output gap:** difference between the demand-determined output Y_t and the supplydetermined potential output \overline{Y}_t , measured as a percentage of the potential output:

output
$$gap = \frac{Y_t}{\overline{Y}_t} - 1$$

- A **negative** output gap means that production is below potential, implying non-equilibrium (or involuntary) unemployment
- A **positive** output gap means that production is above potential. It can occur when there is excessive demand leading to pressure on resources to work beyond usual capacity (shift work, overtime work), which means there will also be an increase in the marginal cost and inflationary pressures. Thus, <u>a positive output gap is not an indication of positive performance</u>. Ideally, we want the output gap to be zero.



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